We analyze the conditions under which credit markets are e¢ cient in providing loans for both new and restarting entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur needs credit for a project which can be run with either high or low risk. Its probability of success depends both on chosen risk and on her entrepreneural skills which are unknown to everybody. If the probability of high skills is su¢ ciently large, two types of equilibria may coexist: a conservative equilibrium with one-o¤ project …nancing, and an experimental equilibrium with fresh project …nancing even after a (limited and endogenously determined) number of failures. If previous risk choices are observable, only the welfare-maximizing experimental equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium. However, if they are unobservable, ine¢ cient sequential equilibria arise in which the entrepreneur chooses the low-risk project too early. These results have novel implications for policy making and capital market design.
Introduction
Imperfect traceability of the reasons for business failures attaches a "stigma of failure"to bankrupt entrepreneurs. When trying a fresh start, they are often left discriminated by business partners, employees, and in particular investors. Despite extensive research, it still remains unclear why the extent of this discrimination varies across countries, sectors and over time. European and Japanese …nanciers, for instance, are perceived to be more reluctant to …nance a failed entrepreneur's restart than their American counterparts. It therefore became commonplace to praise the US'lower "stigma of failure" as the source of its higher entrepreneurship rates 1 and consequently of its competitive edge in terms of the ability to innovate, commercialize and grow. 2 In this paper, we study to what extent di¤erent scopes of the "stigma of failure"
(captured by the maximal number of times a failed entrepreneur is able to get fresh start …nancing) can simultaneously be equilibrium outcomes. Our main result is that as soon as the riskiness of failed projects cannot be evaluated by investors, two types of equilibria may coexist: a conservative equilibrium, where a once-failed entrepreneur is excluded from further …nance, or experimental equilibria, where she can start projects even after a (limited and endogenously determined) number of failures.
In our model, a wealthless entrepreneur seeks funding from a competitive banking sector 3 in order to launch a project. This project can be run with high or low risk of failure. Its probability of success does not only depend on this risk, but also on the entrepreneur's inherent skills 4 , which can be high or low. Unlike in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , neither the entrepreneur nor banks know her skills. Only the distribution of skills is publicly known. If the project is successful, the entrepreneur continues her business, payo¤s are realized and the game is over. If the project fails, the bank that …nanced the project loses its investment and the entrepreneur asks for further entrepreneural …nance in order to start a new project in the next period. The structure of the game is the same in each period. However, after each failure, banks update their belief about the probability whether the entrepreneur has high skills or not. This belief is not only dependent on the initial distribution of skills, but also on the level of risk, which has been chosen in the preceding periods: if this risk has been high (low), the belief about the probability that the entrepreneur has high skills is also relatively high (low).
1 GEM (2008) reports that in 2007, 10.8% of adults were engaged in early-stage entrepreneurship in the US as compared to only 5.4% in the EU or 5.4% in Japan. 2 See Bottazzi et al: (2003) , EU Commission (2000), SME Agency (1999) or Wennekers et al: (2006) . 3 The results can also be applied to alternative forms of entrepreneural …nance. 4 For example, entrepreneural skills can represent whether the ideas of an entrepreneur have a high or low probability of success.
Di¤erent scopes of the "stigma of failure"can occur in equilibrium only if the entrepreneur can trade o¤ the expected return of a project against its maximal return: therefore we assume that a low-risk project has a higher expected return, while the return from the high-risk project in case of success exceeds the return from the low-risk project. We show that if the risk of failure of the high-risk project is not too high and the probability of having high skills is su¢ ciently close to unity, then the …rst-best outcome is as follows: the entrepreneur realizes high-risk projects in the …rst periods and then (if all these projects were unsuccessful) switches to the low-risk project. Finally, if she also fails with the low-risk project, she stops realizing projects as it becomes relatively certain that she has low skills.
We will analyze three informational settings: (I.) Under perfect information, banks can observe both the entrepreneur's past and present risk choices, i.e. there is no moral hazard. We show that any sequential equilibrium is e¢ cient in this setting. (II.) Under private information of banks, these can only assess the riskiness of projects …nanced by themselves. Conservative and experimental equilibria can then simultaneously exist and be sequential equilibria. This is due to the fact that not all banks can observe the entrepreneur's decisions. A bank may then become a monopolistic supplier of …nance to the entrepreneur if all of its competitors believe that the entrepreneur's skills are low.
The credit market outcome might be ine¢ cient, as the entrepreneur chooses the low-risk project too early. (III.) Finally, the same result obtains under moral hazard, where banks can neither observe the riskiness of past, nor present projects: if banks believe that the entrepreneur chooses high (low) risk, they charge a high (low) loan rate, which makes the entrepreneur choose the high (low) risk. There is, however, one exception: there may also arise a situation, in which a conservative equilibrium is more e¢ cient than any experimental equilibrium.
We provide a novel explanation on why economies with identical cultural and institutional constraints can su¤er from di¤erent scopes of the "stigma of failure". Our results lead to a number of policy implications. A banks'ability to observe both past and present risk choices of entrepreneurs proves crucial in preventing credit market ine¢ ciencies. This supports the view that an e¢ cient system of entrepreneural …nance may be based on small banks or venture capital …rms who know their clients'business well. We argue that most of the EU's envisaged policies to reduce the "stigma of failure" might not be e¤ective, since the expectations and actions of many market participants must be changed simultaneously. Likewise, potential gains from an increase in entrepreneurial skills in the population might not fully be realized unless the risk of both past and present projects can be evaluated by investors.
Related Literature Varying levels of the "stigma of failure" have typically been attributed to either persistent cultural or institutional di¤erences between countries. There is nevertheless still widespread dispute about which and how cultural traits might shape attitudes towards entrepreneurial failure. 5 Burchell and Hughes (2006) 
The model
We consider an economy populated by an entrepreneur E and N > 1 banks B k , k 2 f1; :::; N g. 6 Time is discrete and denoted by t 2 f1; 2; :::g. All players are risk-neutral.
The Entrepreneur
The entrepreneur is endowed with entrepreneurial skills i which are either high (i = H)
or low (i = L), but with no wealth on her own. The level of skills i is time-invariant and unobservable to her and banks. However, both E and banks know that the ex-ante probability of high skills is equal to 1 2 (0; 1). In period 1, E has access to a project of size 1, which she can realize or not. If E does not realize the project or she does not get a loan, the game is over an the payo¤ is 0 for all players. Otherwise, E chooses a risk of failure p j of either high (j = H) or low (j = L) value. The project's return structure y ij is determined by E's level of skills i and choice of risk j:
Thereby, y j is the risk-dependent project return in case of success and (1 p j ) i the probability of success when E's skill is i 2 fL; Hg and her risk choice is j 2 fL; Hg. In order to simplify matters, we set p L = 0 and H = 1. If E's project with risk of failure j is successful, she exits the game and her payo¤ is equal to y j minus the loan rate for this project. 7 As E has no own wealth, this payo¤ cannot be negative: if the loan rate is higher than the project return, her payo¤ is equal to 0 and the bank gets the project return. If E's project is not successful, she does not pay anything to the bank that granted the loan and moves on to the next period. The structure of the game is the same in each period.
Thus, E asks for …nance in period t only if she realized t 1 times a project that failed.
As tie-breaking rule we assume that E chooses j = L whenever she is indi¤erent between the high-and the low-risk project.
In period 1, E has a belief~ E Her expected level of skills in a period t is given bỹ
Banks
Banks compete in a Bertrand manner by o¤ering loan contracts to E. A contract only speci…es the loan rate E has to pay in case of success. They also may decide not to o¤er any loans, however, we will assume that banks o¤er contracts as long as they can make zero-pro…ts in expectation. We will consider three informational settings:
(I.) Perfect information (P I): banks can observe the riskiness of both E's past and present projects.
(II.) Private information of banks (P RB): each bank can only observe the riskiness of past and present projects it …nanced itself.
(III.) Imperfect information (IM ): banks cannot observe any project's riskiness.
Each bank B k has a belief~ B k t about the probability that E has high skills if she asks for project …nancing in period t. The way this belief is formed depends on the informational setting: under (P I), banks observe all of the E's past decisions, therefore they can update their belief using Bayes'rule like E does in (1). Under (P RB), a bank k can update its belief from~
t+1 according to Bayes'rule only if it …nanced the project in period t. Otherwise,~ B k t+1 is given exogenously. Under (IM ), the belief of each bank in each period is given exogenously. Denote the expected level of skills in a period 2. E decides whether to undertake a project or not. If yes, she chooses the risk of failure j 2 fL; Hg and the contract with the lowest loan rate for this risk (if more than one bank o¤ers the lowest loan rate, E chooses each of those o¤ers with equal probability). If not, the game is over and payo¤s are 0 for all players.
3. The project is successful or not. In case of success, E receives the payo¤ from the project, pays the loan rate to the bank and the game is over. Otherwise, she defaults and enters the next period. The bank that …nanced the project incurs a loss of 1.
Our main focus lies on the sequential equilibria of the game under the di¤erent informational settings. In our model, any sequential equilibrium exhibits the following features: Firstly, beliefs are derived from Bayes'rule whenever E's actions are observable.
Secondly, banks correctly anticipate E's actions whenever these are unobservable. We therefore have~
for k 2 f1; :::; N g in each period t of an equilibrium. Finally, E's action in period t maximizes her expected payo¤ for given belief and the banks' decisions in subsequent periods. A bank's decisions in period t maximize its expected payo¤ for given belief and other banks' decisions in period t. 8 To illustrate important results, we will also refer sometimes to Nash equilibria of the game (in which beliefs do not play a role).
Projects and the First-Best Outcome
The high-risk project has a higher return than the low-risk project, i.e. y H > y L > 1.
Moreover, it holds that high skills and low risk increase the probability of success, i.e. H > L and p H > p L . The projects taken by the high-(low-) skill entrepreneur always have a positive (negative) net present value (NPV):
E can trade o¤ the expected return of a project against the maximal return, 9 i.e. the expected return from the low-risk project is higher than from the high-risk project:
8 To keep matters simple we suppress some notation here, which would be needed to de…ne the sequential equilibrium formally. The …rst two points follow from the concept of "consistency"of strategies and beliefs, the last point follows from "sequential rationality". To proof "consistency" one usually has to construct a sequence of mixed strategies and beliefs (derived for a given strategy according to Bayes' rule) which converges against the equilibrium strategy pro…le and equilibrium beliefs. For details we refer to Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , pages 337 -338. As equilibria in our model have a very simple structure, we will do without this construction. 9 Our results would be similar in a model in which E can trade-o¤ those two variables continuously.
Consider an entrepreneur with "deep pockets" who knows that she has high skills and who can …nance projects by herself. Given that this entrepreneur has only one chance to realize a project, she would choose the low-risk project if (A1) holds. If (A1) does not hold, she would go for the high-risk project. Assume now that this entrepreneur can start a new project in in…nitely many periods like in our model, i.e. if she succeeds, payo¤s are realized and the game is over, otherwise she can start another project. Her expected payo¤ from always choosing the high-risk project, V H 1 , is then given by
Her expected payo¤ from choosing the low-risk project,
We will assume that V
If (A2) holds, then the entrepreneur with deep pockets and high skills would choose j = H in each period. If (A2) does not hold, she would choose the low-risk project. The assumptions in (A1) and (A2) can be ful…lled at the same time if and only if y L > 1. This is ensured by the fact that both projects have a positive NPV as long as the high-skill entrepreneur runs them.
We now derive the …rst-best outcome if (A1) and (A2) hold and the entrepreneur is uncertain about her skills. Again assume that E has deep pockets and can …nance all projects by herself. Note that in period 1, her expected payo¤ from realizing the low-risk project is positive if and only if
If (4) does not hold, then the entrepreneur does not start any projects. As 1 < 1, she will not …nance high-risk projects in in…nitely many periods, as her belief~ E t ! 0 for t ! 1, according to (1) . If she anticipates in period t that her belief~ E t+1 will be below the right-hand side of (4) in case of failure, then she chooses j = L in this period (and stops realizing projects if this project fails). De…ne
Note that this interval is always non-empty. We then get the …rst-best outcome:
there is a number t 1 2 N, such that the entrepreneur with deep pockets chooses j = H in the periods t 2 f1; :::; t 1 1g and j = L in period t = t 1 . For t 2 N there is a^ 1 < 1, such that t 1 > t whenever 1 >^ 1 .
Equilibria under perfect information (PI)
In our …rst informational setting, banks can evaluate the riskiness of past and present projects. As the NPV of projects run by a low-skill entrepreneur is negative, projects will only be …nanced in …nitely many periods. Facing Bertrand competition, banks only o¤er loan rates, which generate zero pro…ts in equilibrium. Hence, the expected repayment equals the investment sum. If B k then sells a loan contract to E to …nance a project of risk j 2 fL; Hg in period t, the loan rate must be
where~
Let banks'loan rates and E's decisions be given for all t. Denote by V t be the expected payo¤ of E in the beginning of period t. If banks do not provide loans anymore (or if E does not realize a project) in period t, V t = 0. If E gets a loan from B k in period t, her expected payo¤ from realizing a project with risk j is
This allows us to calculate recursively E's expected payo¤ V 1 .
The conservative equilibrium
We …rst show that there is a Nash equilibrium in which E gets …nance only if she never went bankrupt, i.e. in period 1 and never thereafter. If banks do not o¤er loans in periods t 2 f2; 3; :::g, we have V 2 = 0. Equations (5) and (6) imply that E picks j = L in period
This expression is equivalent to (A1). A bank B k provides funding for a low-risk project as long as~
which is satis…ed if 1 2 I( L ; y L ). It remains to show that banks do not provide loans in t 2 f2; 3; :::g. Note that failure of a low-risk project reveals low skills. As all banks can observe E's decisions, it is rational for them not to …nance any more projects. 
Experimental Equilibria
Assume that banks provide …nance up to period t > 1. As the failure of a low-risk project reveals low skills, this only happens if E picks j = H in periods t 2 f1; :::; t 1g. Provided that (A1) holds, E faces the same trade-o¤ in period t as in the previous subsection. In view of a zero-payo¤ in case of failure and a higher expected payo¤ from the low-risk project, E chooses j = L. She might be willing to realize high-risk projects in periods t 2 f1; :::; t 1g if condition (A2) holds. With banks'beliefs being derived from Bayes' rule, (1) entails that for any values of p H , L and k 2 f1; :::; N g:
For any t, we get that~
for t 2 f1; :::; t 1g if 1 is su¢ ciently high. In these periods, projects'NPV is positive, so that banks provide loans to E. This allows us to establish the existence of experimental equilibria:
Lemma 2 Let t 2 N be given. If (A1), (A2) hold and 1 is su¢ ciently high, then under P I there is a Nash equilibrium in which E chooses j = H in periods t 2 f1; :::; t 1g and j = L in period t. Banks …nance all projects in periods t 2 f1; :::; tg, but not in periods t 2 f t + 1; t + 2; :::g.
Again, not every experimental equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium: If in period t, belief~ B k t is su¢ ciently large, then banks can pro…tably …nance projects in period t + 1, given that E chooses j = H in period t. The following result owes to the perfect observability of past and present risk choices:
Proposition 2 (Unique sequential equilibrium outcome under P I) If (A1), (A2)
hold and 1 2 I( L ; y L ), then under P I in any sequential equilibrium, E chooses j = H in the periods t 2 f1; :::; t 1 1g and j = L in period t 1 . Projects are …nanced in periods t 2 f0; :::; t 1 g, but not in periods t 2 f t 1 + 1; t 1 + 2; :::g.
Therefore, if entrepreneural risk choices are perfectly observable, countries with similar entrepreneurial skills and similar institutional constraints should expose the same scope of the "stigma of failure".
Equilibria under private information of banks (PRB)
In this section, we relax the assumption that banks can perfectly observe the riskiness of all past projects. Instead, a bank only knows the risk of projects which it …nanced itself. As in Sharpe (1990) 
The conservative equilibrium
As in the last chapter, we can show that there is a conservative equilibrium if (A1) holds and 1 is su¢ ciently large. Now this is a sequential equilibrium. To see why, assume that E deviates and chooses j = H in period 1 instead of j = L. Further assume that she gets …nanced by bank B k . If her project fails, B k updates its belief about her type to~
according to Bayes'rule as in (1) . All other banks assume that E has chosen the low-risk project in period 1. Their belief about E is~ B l 2 = 0, l 2 f1; :::; k 1; k + 1; :::; N g. Thus, they will refuse to …nance E's project in a period t > 1. This makes B k a monopolistic supplier of …nance to E. It can charge the maximal loan rates, r k t (~ B k t ; j) = y j , in all subsequent periods t > 1. E's expected payo¤ then equals zero. Therefore, it pays o¤ for E to pick the project with the highest expected return in period 1. We conclude:
Lemma 3 If and only if (A1) holds and 1 2 I( L ; y L ), then under P RB there is a sequential equilibrium, in which E chooses j = L in period 1. Banks …nance projects in this period, but do not provide loans in periods t 2 f2; 3; :::g.
Experimental Equilibria
Experimental equilibria have the same form as in the last section: E chooses j = H in the …rst t 1 periods and j = L in t. Given that E and banks (regardless of whether they …nanced the projects of E or not) have the same beliefs on the equilibrium path, banks charge a loan rate according to (5) . For the same reasons as for a conservative equilibrium, these experimental equilibria must be also sequential equilibria. We therefore obtain: Lemma 4 Let t 2 N be given. If (A1), (A2) hold and 1 is su¢ ciently high, then under P RB there is a sequential equilibrium in which E chooses j = H in periods t 2 f1; :::; t 1g and j = L in period t. Banks …nance all projects in periods t 2 f1; :::; tg, but not in periods t 2 f t + 1; t + 2; :::g.
Several experimental equilibria with di¤erent numbers of periods with project …-nancing exist simultaneously if 1 is su¢ ciently close to unity. Note that for a given 1 2 I( L ; y L ), an equilibrium with t 1 periods of project …nancing may not exist: E could probably gain by choosing j = L in all periods t 2 f1; :::; tg and switch to another bank after each failure (as all banks which …nanced previous projects know for sure that E has low skills). However, she will refrain from doing so as long as she feels reasonably comfortable that she has high skills (i.e. as long as 1 and therefore~ E t , t 2 f1; :::; tg, is su¢ ciently high). Combining Lemmata 3 and 4 gives rise to our next result: Proposition 3 (Multiple equilibria under P RB) Let t 2 N be given. If (A1), (A2) hold and 1 is su¢ ciently high, then under P RB both a conservative equilibrium (in which banks only …nance projects in period 1) and an experimental equilibrium (in which banks …nance all projects in periods t 2 f1; :::; tg, but not in periods t 2 f t + 1; t + 2; :::g) exist and are sequential equilibria.
The multiplicity of sequential equilibria implies that the "stigma of failure"may di¤er among countries with the same institutional environment and the same average level of entrepreneural skills. The outcome in the credit market depends on banks'expectations and E's risk choices. If both cannot be altered simultaneously, changes in the institutional environment may not have an impact on the "stigma of failure". Before we discuss this result's welfare-and policy implications, we show that the same also obtains if banks cannot control E's current risk choice.
Equilibria under imperfect information (IM)
Finally, we also relax the assumption about banks' control of E's currently chosen risk level. Instead, banks only know the period number, i.e. how many times E previously went bankrupt. They are also aware of the fact that E can choose between a risky and a less risky business strategy. Details, however, remain hidden to banks. This creates moral hazard in the credit market: E may be inclined to choose the high risk if banks charge a loan rate, which only covers low risk. Still, both conservative and experimental equilibria can exist at the same time as sequential equilibria.
The conservative equilibrium
For a conservative equilibrium, in which E chooses the low-risk project, we must rule out that E can gain from picking a high-risk project. For this, we need to modify assumption (A1):
Note that (A1 ) implies (A1). Assume that E purchases the loan contract from B k in period 1. For a given loan rate r k 1 , E prefers the low-risk project in this period if and only if~
Rearranging terms yields us the inequality
Provided that E chooses j = L, B k makes zero-pro…ts if it charges the loan rate
By combining (7) and (8), we can show the existence of a conservative equilibrium:
Lemma 5 If and only if (A1 ) holds and 1 is su¢ ciently high, then under IM there is a sequential equilibrium, in which E chooses j = L in period 1. Banks …nance projects in this period, but do not provide loans in periods t 2 f2; 3; :::g.
The threat of not providing further credits in the next periods is credible, as banks cannot observe the risk choice of E. Thus, a conservative equilibrium is robust under imperfect information.
Experimental Equilibria
In a sequential equilibrium with t periods of project …nancing, banks correctly anticipate that E chooses j = H in periods t 2 f1; :::; t 1g and j = L in t = t. This results in loan rates of
in t 2 f1; :::; t 1g and
t in all periods t 2 f1; :::; tg for k 2 f1; :::; N g. Again, if (A1 ) holds and~ B k t is su¢ ciently close to unity, then in period t = t, E cannot gain by choosing j = H instead of j = L. In order to show that E cannot pro…tably deviate in periods t 2 f1; :::; t 1g, we need to modify assumption (A2): IM there is a sequential equilibrium, in which E chooses j = H in periods t 2 f1; :::; t 1g
and j = L in period t. Banks …nance all projects in periods t 2 f1; :::; tg, but not in periods t 2 f t + 1; t + 2; :::g.
Again, it may well be that for given 1 2 I( L ; y L ), an equilibrium with t 1 periods of project …nancing does not exist, as loan rates are in ‡exible to entrepreneural decisions:
E does not choose j = L in periods t 2 f1; :::; t 1g if she is relatively convinced of her high skills (and therefore will be successful with the low-risk project in period t with high probability).
Consequently, the existence of multiple equilibria remains una¤ected by the introduction of imperfect information. Combining Lemmata 5 and 6 leads us to conclude:
hold and 1 is su¢ ciently high, then under IM both a conservative equilibrium (in which banks only …nance projects in period 1) and an experimental equilibrium (in which banks …nance all projects in periods t 2 f1; :::; tg, but not in periods t 2 f t + 1; t + 2; :::g) exist and are sequential equilibria.
Welfare and policy implications
The results under the di¤erent informational settings o¤er a new framework for the analysis of welfare and policy making.
Welfare
Perfect Information and Private Information of Banks As banks make zero expected pro…ts in all periods, welfare is given by the E's expected payo¤ V 1 at the beginning of the …rst period. 11 We have shown that in the setting with perfect information, the …rst-best outcome with t 1 periods of project …nancing is realized in any sequential equilibrium. The tie-breaking rule for E implies that in any other Nash equilibrium with fewer periods of project …nancing, E's expected payo¤ must be smaller (as the low-risk project is realized too soon). However, in the setting with private information of banks, these equilibria can be sequential equilibria. This implies that the credit market outcome with private information may be ine¢ cient.
Consider now two assessments with t 1 and t 2 , t 1 < t 2 , periods of project …nancing, where E picks j = H in the periods t 2 1; :::; t l 1 and j = L in period t l , l 2 f1; 2g.
By Lemma 4, these assessments can be equilibrium outcomes if 1 is su¢ ciently high. Let
the expected payo¤s of E in the corresponding equilibria. It must hold
, E could increase her expected payo¤ in period t 1 of the equilibrium with t 2 periods of project …nancing by choosing j = L. The loan rate for this project must be the same in both equilibria. If
, then the tie-breaking rule implies that E chooses j = L in period t 1 . We conclude that welfare is higher in an equilibrium with more periods of project …nancing than in an equilibrium with fewer periods of project …nancing.
Imperfect Information Under imperfect information, things are more di¢ cult. We saw that an experimental equilibrium exists even if (A2) does not hold. Then, it is against the E's interest to realize high-risk projects. The reason is that after subtracting the bank's break-even loan rate, this project's net return in case of success is lower than for the low-risk project. E would prefer to realize projects with low risk. Yet, if banks assume that E chooses the high-risk realization of the project, the high loan rate prevents E from picking the low risk. This e¤ect is the same as in models of asymmetric information in which ine¢ cient high-risk projects crowd out e¢ cient low-risk projects. A conservative then dominates any experimental equilibrium. However, (A1 ) and (A2) can be ful…lled at the same time if and only if y L > 2. This implies that if y L 2 holds, any experimental equilibrium is dominated by a conservative equilibrium under imperfect information.
Provided that y L > 2 and that assumptions (A1 ), (A2) and (A2 ) are ful…lled, an experimental equilibrium may well dominate a conservative equilibrium. We know from Lemma 6 that if 1 is su¢ ciently high, there can simultaneously exist equilibria with di¤erent numbers of periods of project …nancing. As before, we can show that an equilibrium with more periods of project …nancing always dominates an equilibrium with fewer periods of project …nancing in terms of welfare.
Example Consider a scenario with the following values: y L = 2:5, y H = 2:66, p H = 0:1, L = 0:3, 1 = 0:9. It is straightforward to verify that assumptions (A1), (A1 ), (A2) and (A2 ) are satis…ed for these values. Let the equilibrium loan rates for k 2 f1; :::; N g be as follows:
The expected payo¤ in the conservative equilibrium (with~ 
Policy Implications
Banking System Design Our analysis shows that the observability of entrepreneurs' past and present risk choices is a crucial feature that prevents ine¢ ciencies in the credit market. We think that a banking system, which is most likely to exhibit this feature, is based on small, specialized and regional banks or on venture capitalists. Such institutions keep close ties to their clients and may well observe the risk involved in past and present business decisions. Some empirical support for this result comes from a comparison of the EU and Japan to the US: by trend, a more (less) pronounced "stigma of failure" seems to go in hand with more bank …nance (market …nance).
Economies with a …nancial system in which banks are able to observe past and present risk choices should be left unchanged. As the highest equilibrium level of welfare is attained in any sequential equilibrium, there is no room for policies aimed at changing the nature of the equilibrium. In particular, a conservative equilibrium may be the result of However, under private information or imperfect information of banks, in ‡exible beliefs about entrepreneurial decisions deter policy's impact on the nature of the equilibrium.
Unless banks'credit o¤ers and agents'risk-taking behavior becomes simultaneously coordinated to another equilibrium, only the direct e¤ect will materialize.
Conclusion
This paper presents a multi-period credit market model where the extent to which failed entrepreneurs are excluded from further start-up …nancing is determined endogenously.
The results'key driver is the evolution of a banks belief with regard to an entrepreneur's skills and its interplay with her risk choices. If the probability of high skills is su¢ ciently large, multiple equilibria may obtain. We observed that under perfect information (i.e. if banks can evaluate both past and present risk choices of an entrepreneur), in any sequential equilibrium the …rst-best outcome is realized. Second, under private information of banks (i.e. if banks can evaluate only the risk of projects which were …nanced by themselves), both a conservative and experimental equilibria are sequential equilibria. The multiplicity of equilibria is robust. Finally, the same result obtains if banks cannot evaluate the risk of any projects. We concluded that the outcome in credit markets where banks do not always observe the full history of entrepreneural risk choices can be ine¢ -cient. Policy measures aiming at lowering the "stigma of failure" might not be e¤ective, because banks'expectations and entrepreneurs'actions must simultaneously be shifted to a new equilibrium. However, our results also leave room for regulation: a banking system with small banks that know well their clients'business should be more prone to achieving an e¢ cient allocation than one with arms-length …nance.
Altogether, our paper is a starting point that o¤ers ample scope for future research.
It allows for the incorporation of numerous additional factors that might in ‡uence credit market conditions, such as education, social security, or the tax system. More speci…-cally, the integration of learning would result in a lower decline of …nanciers'beliefs about entrepreneurs' skills over time. A population's age distribution should also matter, as younger agents have a higher risk appetite and thus readiness to create new …rms, see Lévesque and Minniti (2006) . Related work suggests taking into account multi-tool contracts (that include risk monitoring or quality screening) or various e¤ects of the creation of innovative …rms, such as technological-or demand-spillovers. At last, more convincing empirical evidence is needed to support e¤ective policy making.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1
If E chooses j = L and the project fails, E knows about her low skills. She then does not realize any further projects. Therefore, consider the sequence t = 1; 2; ::: and the set of assessments in which E chooses j = H in periods t 2 f1; :::; t 1g, j = L in period t , and no more projects thereafter. Denote by V (t ) t the expected payo¤ of E at the beginning of period t 2 f1; :::; t g under the assessment with t periods of project realizations. We have
and for t 2 f1; :::; t 1g
For given 1 < 1, there is a …nite periodt, such that~ E t y L 1 < 0 and (1 p H )~ E t y H 1 < 0 for all t t , regardless of the assessment. That is why V (t ) 1 is only positive for a …nite number of assessments with periods of project realizations t 2 f1; :::; t g. Pick two numbers g 1 ; g 2 2 f1; :::; t g with
, then we have V
for t 2 f1; :::; g 1 g. Otherwise, we would havẽ
which contradicts V
. Hence, E never can gain by switching from one assessment to another after period 0. Because of the tie-breaking rule, we have
; t 2 f1; :::; t g o :
To prove the second claim, consider two assessments with g 1 ; g 2 2 N, g 1 < g 2 , periods of project realizations. We can then calculate that
for l 2 f1; 2g. If (A2) holds, then
:
is continuous in 1 for all t 2 N. Thus, there is a^ 1 < 1, such that
whenever 1 >^ 1 and therefore t 1 > g 1 .
Proof of Lemma 2
Assume that the equilibrium is as stated in the claim. As banks make zero pro…ts in equilibrium, we get
and for t < t,
First, consider the last period t: as in Lemma 1, (A1) ensures that E chooses j = L in period t, given that banks do not …nance projects in future periods. Next, focus on a period t < t. If E chooses j = L in this period, her expected payo¤ is equal to~
since no loans will be provided to her in future periods. E therefore chooses j = H if
It follows from (1) and (2) Note that V t is continuous in 1 . Thus, (14) holds if 1 is su¢ ciently close to unity.
Proof of Proposition 2
In any sequential equilibrium, we have~ t. From assumption (A1) if follows that in the last period of an equilibrium, in which projects are …nanced by banks, E chooses j = L. It is also clear that in the periods before this last period, E chooses j = H. Otherwise, banks would not …nance projects any longer. Consider therefore the sequence t = 1; 2; ::: and the set of assessments in which E chooses j = H in periods t 2 f1; :::; t 1g, j = L in period t and banks …nance all projects in periods t 2 f1; :::; t g, but not in periods t 2 ft + 1; t + 2; :::g. Denote by V (t ) t the expected payo¤ of E in period t 2 f1; :::; t g under the assessment with t periods of project …nancing. As banks make expected zero pro…ts in each period of a sequential equilibrium, we have if (A2) holds. Thus, if 1 is su¢ ciently large, then E chooses j = H in period t 1. By going through the same steps, one can show that E chooses j = H in all periods t < t if 1 is su¢ ciently large.
Proof of Lemma 6
We must have~ for k 2 f1; :::; N g and all periods t of a sequential equilibrium.
Assume that E acts as stated in the claim. Banks charge loan rates r k t , k 2 f1; :::; N g, t 2 f1; :::; tg, such that they make zero-pro…ts in expectation. Denote by V t the corresponding expected payo¤ of E at the beginning of period t 2 f1; :::; tg. For period t, the proof proceeds as for Lemma 5. Next, focus on a period t < t. Note that E has private information about her probability of success whenever she deviates from the equilibrium path in these periods: if she chooses j = L, and this project fails, then she knows that she has low skills. However, as banks do not observe E's decisions, the loan rates in the next periods are not a¤ected by E's risk choice. Denote byṼ t the expected payo¤ of E at the beginning of period t 2 f2; :::; tg if she knows for sure that she has low skills but follows the equilibrium path of play. Trivially, it holds that V t >Ṽ t . E chooses j = H in period t if Rearranging terms gives
Recall the loan rate in period t is given by (9) . Assumption (A2 ) ensures that inequality (17) holds if 1 is su¢ ciently large. Thus, if (A1 ) and (A2 ) hold and 1 is su¢ ciently high, then E chooses j = H in periods t 2 f1; :::; t 1g and j = L in period t.
